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From survivors to replicators: Evolution by natural selection revisited 
Abstract 
For evolution by natural selection to occur it is classically admitted that the three ingredients of variation, difference 
in fitness and heredity are necessary and sufficient. In this paper, I show using simple individual-based models, 
that evolution by natural selection can occur in populations of entities in which neither heredity nor reproduction 
are present. Furthermore, I demonstrate by complexifying these models that both reproduction and heredity are 
predictable Darwinian products (i.e. complex adaptations) of populations initially lacking these two properties but 
in which new variation is introduced via mutations. Later on, I show that replicators are not necessary for 
evolution by natural selection, but rather the ultimate product of such processes of adaptation. Finally, I assess the 
value of these models in three relevant domains for Darwinian evolution.  
 
1. Introduction 
Since Darwin, a number of “recipes”, to use Godfrey-Smith’s terminology (2009), have been 
proposed to delimit the phenomenon of evolution by natural selection (ENS). Each of these 
recipes has three essential ingredients, in so far as they each claim that, to exhibit ENS, a 
population of entities must have 1) variation, leading to 2) differences in fitness and 3) a form of 
heredity for this variation (for different recipes see Brandon 1990; Darwin 1859; Endler 1986; 
Lewontin 1970, 1978, 1985; Okasha 2006; Ridley 1996). These three ingredients are often 
conceived as both necessary and sufficient for ENS and applying not only to biological 
populations, but to virtually any population of entities. Although it is not emphasized by most 
authors (for an exception see Ridley 1996), a condition of reproduction is presupposed by each 
of these recipes. This is because the concept of heredity entails the concept of reproduction. In 
this paper I explore the links between reproduction, heredity and ENS. One aim of the paper is 
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to demonstrate that, strictly speaking, ENS can occur in populations of entities that do not 
reproduce and as a consequence heredity is not required for ENS. This point has already been 
argued forcefully by Bouchard in different places (2004, 2008, 2011) but only verbally. I will 
argue that ENS in non-reproducing and reproducing populations is one and the same process 
based on the use of models. But, as such, this claim seems to undermine the crucial role of 
reproduction and heritability in Darwinian processes. Thus a second, more important, aim of the 
paper will be to show that reproduction and heredity, despite not being essential components of 
ENS, do have a special role in Darwinian processes; namely that they can be primordial 
adaptations of non-reproductive Darwinian populations, indispensable for complex cumulative 
adaptations (such as the human eye or brain). Finally, I will outline a new interpretation of the 
concept of fitness in light of these arguments that will partially vindicate Bouchard’s approach on 
fitness.  
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. In Section 2 I show that ENS or a process 
close enough to ENS (weak ENS), can occur in populations of entities that do not reproduce. I 
thus argue that heredity and reproduction are not essential components of ENS. Although this 
represents a serious problem for a foundational description of the process of ENS, I concur with 
Okasha (2006) that this form of ENS is evolutionarily uninteresting since populations of non-
reproducing entities cannot lead to adaptations as classically understood by evolutionary 
biologists. At that point it will become clear that the different recipes of ENS describe one 
particular form of ENS that allows for cumulative evolution and complex adaptations. I will call 
this particular form of ENS: paradigmatic ENS. From then on, I ask whether paradigmatic ENS 
can originate from weak ENS or whether the two forms of ENS are due to two fundamentally 
different processes of natural selection.  
In Sections 3 and 4, I answer this question by showing, using individual-based models that 
paradigmatic ENS not only can but is likely to originate from weak ENS. These two sections 
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present a diachronic account of ENS in which the third ingredient, heredity (including 
reproduction), is not taken for granted, but rather “endogeneized”1 into a broader account of 
ENS. Endogeneizing paradigmatic ENS will necessitate four cumulative steps. a) New variation 
must be introduced in the population over time. Without it, no cumulative evolution at all is 
possible. This will be postulated in all my models. b) At least some members of this population 
must be able to reproduce for otherwise the population goes extinct. I show how that is possible 
in Section 3. c) Given that the population is able to maintain its size, all the entities of the 
population must be able to reproduce and d) differences in fitness must be transmitted from 
parents to offspring. I show how these two phenomena are possible in Section 4. At the end of 
Section 4 it will become clear that heredity is actually a complex adaptation of Darwinian 
populations in which originally only weak ENS is possible. Most of my reasoning will be based 
on simulations of individual-based models using the software NETLOGO 5.02 (Wilensky 1999). 
Using simulations will have two virtues. First, it will help the reader to see the different concepts 
and processes I explore “in action”. Second, it will allow me to develop models that although 
simple, are too complex to be expressed verbally efficiently. 
In Section 5, I assess the value of the endogeneization-of-heredity hypothesis in three domains 
of relevance for the concept of ENS : origins of life, major transition and cultural evolution.  
 
2. ENS without reproduction 
                                                          
1 I borrow this term and idea from Okasha (2006) and his discussion on the levels of selection in 
which he explains that multicellular organisms once taken for granted by individual level 
selection theory have been “endogeneized” by the multilevel selection theory, which makes of 
multicellularity a product of natural selection.  
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Existing recipes postulate heredity as a necessary condition for ENS. Yet, one can easily find 
cases in which ENS or a very similar process is observed, but in which there is no reproduction. 
Take this example given by Van Valen (1989, 2):  
“[Granite] is composed mostly of grains of feldspars and quartz, with some mica and other 
minerals inserted among them. When granite weathers, the feldspars and micas become clays but 
nothing much happens to the quartz grains. They are most resistant and get transported down 
streams or along shores. Thus most beaches are the result of differentially eroded granite. This is 
an example of natural selection in the nonliving world. Quartz grains survive longer than feldspar 
grains, and there is a progressive increase in the average resistance to weathering, of the set of 
grains that have still survived […]The lack of reproduction imposes constraints on the flexibility 
of evolution here, but one shouldn't confuse that with the selection itself.” 
Although grains of quartz, feldspars and mica do not reproduce in any reasonable sense of the 
word, there is a form of selection on grains of minerals which leads to an overall change in the 
population. This type of selection is called viability selection or more generally selection on persistence. I 
call entities that only undergo this type of selection “survivors”. The fact that a form of ENS can 
be observed in populations of survivors represents a serious problem for standard recipes of 
ENS. These recipes supposedly capture the essence of ENS; yet, it seems as if they do not 
recognize viability selection in populations of survivors as resulting in ENS. Why is this case?  
One direct response to this question, given by Godfrey-Smith (2009, 40), is that, although an 
extension of the Darwinian apparatus to populations of survivors is possible, it is very artificial. 
By “artificial”, I take it Godfrey-Smith means that historically, the concept of natural selection 
has only been applied to (living) entities that do reproduce. Applying these ideas to entities that 
do not reproduce is, in this sense, artificial because the theory was not elaborated with non-
reproductive entities in mind. Although it might be historically artificial to extend the concept of 
ENS to populations of entities that do not reproduce, artificiality cannot be a strong argument 
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against a foundational description of Darwinian processes or what Griesemer calls generalization 
by abstraction of Darwinian evolutionary theory (Griesemer 2005). If recipes of ENS represent 
such foundational descriptions, they should be able to account for the simplest cases. 
Another answer comes from Okasha (2006, 214) in his discussion of clade selection. He uses the 
term weak selection when referring to processes of selection between different types of survivors 
(because they do not “reproduce,” clades are a type of survivor in my terminology). Okasha 
claims that the concept of natural selection is interesting and can lead to adaptations only when 
applied to entities that reproduce. If selection in populations of survivors cannot lead to 
adaptations, it might be justified to separate cases of differential persistence (weak ENS,) from 
cases of paradigmatic ENS. 
Some people even refuse to grant differential persistence or viability of types the status of 
evolution, let alone ENS. Whether we should call the phenomenon resulting from weak selection 
“evolution” is in fact disputable. I am inclined to grant it the status of ENS because changes in 
frequency of types or variants due to the sole action of selection are usually identified by 
population geneticists as evolution. But essentially this problem is mostly a terminological one 
and is not what I am interested in here. The only important question I want to answer is whether 
weak ENS (or whatever one wants to call it) and paradigmatic ENS are two fundamentally 
distinct processes. As we saw, Okasha considers weak ENS uninteresting because it cannot lead 
to adaptations. This seems to be the kind of fundamental difference between the two forms of 
ENS we are looking for. But is this proposition correct? Is it correct to claim that there are no 
adaptations under a process of weak ENS? This mostly depends on what Okasha means by 
adaptation. Brandon (1990, 40) proposes distinguishing ahistorical adaptations,2 which simply refer 
to properties that increase the fitness of their possessors, from “adaptation as products of the 
                                                          
2 A synonym for ahistorical adaptation is  “adaptiveness” 
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process of ENS” (referred to later as genuine adaptations). I take it that what Brandon means by a 
“product of the process of ENS” is something similar to what Godfrey-Smith calls the “positive 
role of natural selection” (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 49-50). In his discussion on origin and 
distribution explanations, Godfrey-Smith proposes that in spite of its “negative” role (i.e. 
eliminating variation over time) natural selection has a positive, creative role in evolution. It does 
so by “changing the population-level background against which new mutations can occur” 
(Godfrey-Smith 2009, 50).  
The following is a schematic way to represent the process behind changes in population-level 
background against which new mutations can occur. In a population of entities that reproduce in 
which there is variation with regard to one trait, selection (let us assume it is directional) will 
eliminate most of the variants, keeping only the fittest ones. These variants will then reproduce 
and transmit their phenotype to their offspring, so that the successful phenotypes become 
relatively more highly represented in the overall population. New advantageous mutations 
further increasing the fitness of their bearers will thus become more probable. Godfrey-Smith 
argues that this is the kind of phenomenon that leads to complex adaptations such as the human 
eye or brain. That is, I take it, the kind of adaptation Okasha claims is not possible in 
populations of survivors. Ahistorical adaptations are, however, perfectly possible in these 
populations. 
In some respects Okasha is right. Genuine adaptations cannot appear in population of survivors, 
but not because of some fundamental distinction between a population of survivors and a 
population of reproducing entities.  The reason why they cannot appear is because the 
probability of successive “lucky” mutations is so low in those populations that they become 
nearly impossible. Going back to Van Valen’s quote, a low probability of successive 
advantageous mutation is the constraint on the flexibility of evolution the lack of reproduction 
imposes on populations. Yet, in principle with luck or with an enormous population size 
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(assuming that some mutations occur), genuine complex adaptations could appear in a 
population of survivors. Thus, the concept of adaptation cannot separate the two forms of ENS. 
Is there any other way to separate them? 
In the next two sections I argue that weak and paradigmatic ENS should in fact not be separated 
because paradigmatic ENS is a special case of ENS that not only can, but is likely to originate in 
populations of survivors with the ability to mutate. The reason for this is that heredity and 
reproduction can be themselves genuine complex adaptations in those populations. In fact 
moving from a population of survivors to a population exhibiting paradigmatic ENS will require 
four cumulative steps or conditions. The first step is a) that new variation is introduced in the 
population. Without it no cumulative evolution is possible.  The second step is that b) the 
population is able to maintain its size or if the size of the population is not limited, to grow. This 
is not the cases in weak ENS, in which populations are ultimately condemned to extinction. But 
a population able to maintain its size does not make it a population in which paradigmatic ENS 
necessarily occurs. Two other important phenomena occur in paradigmatic cases of ENS: c) 
advantageous phenotypes are able to be transmitted during reproduction making population-
level changes against which new mutations can occur possible, and finally d) reproduction is 
pervasive therefore each entity in the population is in principle able to reproduce. Invasion of 
one variant in the population of reproducing entities under the sole action of natural selection is 
the hallmark of a process of genuine adaptation.  
In the next section I build three individual-based models that will show how one can move from 
a population of survivors to a population of entities able to maintain its size and thus meet 
conditions a and b. I will distinguish the concept of procreation, which is reproduction without 
heredity, from the concept of minimal reproduction, which is indefinite procreation i.e. procreation 
being transmitted from parents to offspring. I will then show that minimal reproduction, but not 
procreation, once introduced in a population of survivors through mutation (a), leads this 
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population to maintain its size (b). Yet these conditions will be insufficient for paradigmatic ENS 
to occur. At that point I will propose an important distinction between heredity of and heredity 
on. In Section 4, using other models, I show how conditions c and d can be obtained from a 
population of entities able to maintain its size by introducing heredity on the ability to procreate 
(i.e. reproduction) and heredity on other Darwinian traits and why heredity on represents a 
genuine adaptation of those populations. Towards the end of Section 4, I propose that the 
existence of replicators (Dawkins 1982; Hull 1980) can result from a similar process of 
adaptation and thus can be conceived as a product of natural selection rather than condition for 
it.  
 
3. Reproduction and heredity in ENS 
How can we get a population which maintains its size from a population of survivors? It seems 
that the ability to reproduce is the right property to give to our survivors. But reproduction is a 
complex phenomenon that can be decomposed into two more fundamental phenomena: the 
first, which I name procreation,3 is reproduction without any property transmitted from parents 
to offspring including the ability to procreate; the second is inheritance from parent to offspring 
of the ability to procreate. A procreated entity of any given reference class inherits nothing from 
its parents but the facts of coming into existence and membership of that class. It might be 
difficult to imagine an act of procreation which would not involve the transmission of some 
properties other than the fact of coming into existence and the choice of a reference class is a 
well-known problem in statistics. Rotten meat could be said to ‘procreate’ maggots if one had in 
mind a theory of spontaneous generation with the class of reference “entities made of flesh”. 
Although spontaneous generation theories are absent from modern biology, it should be clear 
                                                          
3 I distinguish procreation from “progeneration” used by Griesemer (2000) which is in my 
terminology, procreation with material overlap.  
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that procreation in a given class of objects does not necessarily involve inheritance or 
transmission of traits and that it is therefore the right concept we need for our purpose since we 
want to dissociate heredity from reproduction. 
With the distinction between procreation and reproduction in mind, we can now start to imagine 
the fate of a population of survivors in which there is variation in viability and some of these 
survivors spontaneously mutate into procreators: entities able to procreate. Does this mutation 
allow our initial population of survivors to maintain its size? 
To answer this question, I built a set of individual-based models. 4  In their simplest form, 
individual-based models simulate the behavior of individuals that are “asked” every unit of time 
to behave in a certain way (e.g. to move, to reproduce, to die etc.). My models describe a 
population initially composed of survivors. Each survivor has only one property, its survival rate 
over each unit of time, which remains constant during its whole life and is fixed at birth. The 
survival rate of each survivor is chosen randomly between 0 and 0.99 (to avoid immortal 
survivors). Time is discrete. For every unit of time the population undergoes one selection event.   
During the event of selection, each individual is selected according to its survival rate, also called 
viability. Selection operates as follows: if a given individual has a survival rate of 0.6 (recall that 
this value is chosen randomly at birth), this means that its chances of surviving this round of 
selection will be 60%. The lower the survival rate, the lower the chances of the individual 
surviving until the next unit of time. 
 
                                                          
4 The software NETLOGO 5.02 has been used. Two advantages of individual-based models (a 
microscopic approach to modeling) over macroscopic approaches are their flexibility (which 
makes them appealing for testing new hypotheses) and that they allow for each individual in the 
simulation to be unique. These two features make individual-based modeling ideal for the 
purpose of this article. 
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Figure 1. Simulation of Model 1 over 400 units of time 
Model 1 is essentially similar to ENS without reproduction as proposed in Section 2. There are 
only survivors in the population and no mutants. Figure 1 represents the graph of one typical 
simulation of Model 1 in which the number of survivors is recorded over time. At t=0, 5000 
survivors are created. As expected the population rapidly goes extinct. Model 1 represents a null 
model in my framework upon which the following models are built.  Table 1 summarizes the 
different models and associated concepts used in Section 2 and 3. 
What happens now to this population if procreation is introduced by mutation of one survivor 
into a procreator? A second model (Model 2) was created to answer this question. Model 2 is 
very similar to Model 1 but procreation is introduced in the population through one mutant 
individual at the beginning of the simulation (see Table 1). When a survivor mutates into a 
procreator it acquires the possibility to procreate.5 Condition a (that new variation is introduced 
into the population) is thus built into the model. Hence, procreators have two properties: a 
                                                          
5 In Model 2 we assume that the mutation has already occurred. Mutation is thus exogenous to 
the model. 
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survival rate within each unit of time (as do survivors) and a fertility rate (i.e. number of 
individuals procreated) within each unit of time as long as the procreator is alive. The fertility 
rate of a procreator remains constant throughout the whole life of the minimal reproducer unless 
further mutation occurs. 
As in Model 1, every individual undergoes selection. But after selection procreators are able to 
procreate.6 During this stage each procreator, if any exist, procreates according to their fertility 
rate. Because there is no heredity on viability, the offspring’s viability is chosen randomly 
between the minimal and maximal values allowed by the model (0 and 0.99). Because there is no 
heredity of the ability to procreate, offspring of procreators are survivors. After the stage of 
procreation, another stage is introduced in the model. I call it the check-for-overcrowding stage. 
During this stage, the size of the population is assessed and if it is higher than its initial size, 
individuals are randomly chosen and killed until the population roughly reaches its initial size. 
The sequence of events undergone by every individual in Model 2 is selection  reproduction  
check-for-overcrowding; this restarts every unit of time. 
 
                                                          
6 In Model 2 and subsequent, procreation is always asexual.  
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Figure 2a. Simulation of Model 2 over 900 units of time 
 
Figure 2b: Simulation of Model 2 over 900 units of time (zoom in) 
Figure 2a and 2b both represent the graph of one (and the same) typical simulation of Model 2 in 
which the number of survivors and procreators is recorded over time. At t=0, 4999 survivors 
and 1 procreator which has mutated from a survivor are created. For the purpose of my 
argument, the viability and fertility of the mutant procreators are the highest possible allowed by 
the model(respectively 0.99 and 10) in order to maximize its fitness and see whether any change 
at all is possible when compared to a population of survivors only. As can be seen in figure 2b, 
the population becomes extinct after 700 units of time while the procreator before the 300th unit 
of time. This is not a surprising result. Because procreators’ offspring are survivors, the 
population is only able to produce new entities as long as the initial procreator is alive. Once this 
initial procreator dies, the population becomes similar to the population of survivors in Model 1. 
No matter how many procreators there are in the initial population, this population is ultimately 
condemned to extinction.  
Thus, a population in which procreation has emerged is unable to maintain its size and the type 
of ENS observed in this population is very similar to weak ENS. I call it quasi-weak ENS. This 
result is good evidence that heredity must be part of the reason why a population is able to 
display paradigmatic ENS and more proximally to satisfy b, simply because without heredity of 
the ability to procreate, a population will become extinct. Let’s now see what happens in our 
population if instead of a procreator the mutant introduced is a minimal reproducer. I define a 
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minimal reproducer as a procreator which is able to transmit its ability to procreate to some, if 
not all, of its offspring. I call this entity a minimal reproducer because its ability to procreate is not 
transmitted to every one of its offspring.   
In Model 3, I start as in Model 2 with a population of 4999 survivors and one mutant (in this 
case a minimal reproducer). Minimal reproducers behave in a similar way to procreators except 
that some of their offspring are also minimal reproducers. Thus, the only difference between 
Model 2 and Model 3 is that in Model 3 rules of transmission of fertility and of the ability to 
procreate between parent and offspring must be chosen (see Table 1). The rule of transmission 
of viability remains the same. The sequence of events undergone by every individual each unit of 
time in this model is the same as in Model 2. 
I now introduce the distinction between heredity of and heredity on. When there is heredity of a 
trait, the only thing a parent transmits to their offspring is the trait itself. The offspring’s 
phenotype associated with this trait is uncorrelated to the phenotype of the parent and thus can 
take any possible value on that trait. When there is heredity on (which presupposes heredity of) a 
given trait, there is a correlation between the parent’s and the offspring’s phenotype on that trait. 
In a case of heredity of no prediction of the offspring’s phenotype from the parent’s phenotype is 
possible while some level of prediction is possible in a case of heredity on7 To make this clear 
imagine that an entity of size S produces 10 offspring and that the scope of possibility on size of 
a given entity of the class of reference is between 1 and 10. If there is only heredity of size, the 
size of the offspring will be uncorrelated with the size S of the parent. If there heredity on size, 
the offspring will be more likely to have size S than any other size between 1 and 10.   
                                                          
7 Another way to make the distinction is by using the well-known distinction between 
determinable and determinate (Sanford 2011). Heredity of is a determinable property while 
heredity on is a determinate property 
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Because there is no heredity in my models, except in relation to the ability to procreate in Model 
3, the rule of transmission for fertility is that each minimal reproducer produced receives a 
fertility rate chosen randomly between the minimal (0) and maximal (10) fertility rate set by the 
model. The rule of transmission of the ability to procreate can be more difficult to choose. In 
fact, by introducing minimal reproducers in the model, there can be heredity of the ability to 
procreate, with or without heredity on this ability. When there is heredity of the ability to 
procreate, the only thing we can predict from a minimal reproducer, knowing its rate of 
transmission, is the proportions of its offspring that will be minimal reproducers. To which 
degree they will receive this ability – i.e. the proportion of their own offspring that will receive 
the ability – is unpredictable. I call minimal reproducers with this ability: unreliable minimal 
reproducers. On the other hand, when there is heredity on the ability to procreate, not only can 
we predict the proportion of offspring that will receive this ability but we can also predict, with a 
probability higher than chance, what level of reproductive ability each of the offspring will 
receive. This probability will itself depend on how reliable the transmission between parent and 
offspring is. I call minimal reproducers with this ability: reliable minimal reproducers.  
In Model 3 heredity of the ability to procreate is introduced without heredity on the ability to 
procreate in order to see whether this simpler form of heredity is sufficient to make it such that 
our population is able to maintain its size. I set heredity of the ability to procreate at a maximal 
level of 0.20 so that a minimal reproducer cannot have more than 20% of its offspring as 
minimal reproducers. The level at which a minimal reproducer’s offspring receives this ability is 
chosen randomly between 0 and 0.2. I have set the maximal level of heredity very low in order 
see whether even low heredity of the ability to procreate is sufficient for a population to maintain 
its size and thus satisfy b. 
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Figure 3a. Simulation of Model 3 over 400 units of time 
Figure 3a represents the graph of a typical simulation of Model 3 in which the number of 
survivors, minimal reproducers, as well as the total number of individuals is recorded over time. 
At t=0, 4999 survivors and 1 minimal reproducer, which has mutated from a survivor, are 
created. As in Model 2, for the purpose of my argument in this simulation the survival rate, 
fertility rate and transmission rate of the ability to procreate of the mutant minimal reproducer 
are the maximum possible allowed by the model (respectively 0.99, 10 and 0.20) in order to 
maximize its fitness and maximize the chance of observing a difference between this model and 
the previous ones. The graph shows that during the first 15 units of time (in this particular 
simuation) the population behaves in similar way as in the two previous models: the population 
size drastically decreases. However, in contrast to the previous models, the population does not 
go extinct. After some time, the population size starts to increase until it reaches the maximal 
size around the 100th unit of time. At that point the size of the population remains stable and is 
composed of around 10% minimal reproducers.  
We can conclude from Model 3 that heredity of the ability to procreate is sufficient for a 
population to maintain its size. It thus satisfies b, one of the three remaining requirements for a 
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population to be able to exhibit paradigmatic ENS. But we have not yet established whether it 
satisfies c, i.e. the requirement that there be change in population level background against which 
new mutations can occur and d, i.e. the requirement that every individual of the population is 
able to reproduce, is not met. 
One way to see whether c is satisfied is to check whether individuals with the highest fitness are 
able to invade the population. If they do, this will represent a change in the population-level 
background against which new mutations can occur. But measuring fitness in our population is 
problematic. We have two types of entities, survivors and unreliable minimal reproducers, with 
different behaviors. Fitness is usually measured as the product of viability and fertility (Sober 
2002). This definition of fitness cannot be applied to survivors because their fertility is nil (see 
[blind reference] for more on this problem). Yet, as we have seen earlier, some survivors are 
fitter than others since they persist longer. The fittest survivors are those with a survival rate of 
0.99. The fittest minimal reproducers are also those with the highest viability. Importantly, there 
is no fertility selection in the model. Each minimal reproducer has on average 5 (between 0 and 
10) offspring per unit of time independently of its phenotype if it survives until reproduction.  
Viability selection is thus the only form of selection in the population regardless of whether the 
population contains survivors or minimal reproducers. This means that in Model 3, viability is 
the only parameter influencing the fitness of an entity. Therefore to evaluate whether entities 
with the highest fitness are able invade the population we need to see whether the variants of 
each type (i.e. survivor and minimal reproducer) with the highest viability allowed by the model 
(in this case 0.99) are able to invade the population. 
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Figure 3b. Simulation of Model 3 over 400 units of time 
Figure 3b represents a typical simulation of Model 3 over 400 units of time in which the 
proportions of entities with a viability of 0.99 is measured. The figure shows that the proportion 
of entities with a survival rate equal to 0.99, very low at t=0, increases and reaches an equilibrium 
around 0.05 around t=130. Thus in this model the population is not invaded by the fittest 
variants of each type. This is explained by the fact that there is no heredity on any properties in 
this set up, and successes and failures in terms of survival are not recorded by natural selection. 
Each survivor procreated by a minimal reproducer has the same chance of having a low viability 
as a high one, in spite of the fact that most of the survivors procreated come from minimal 
reproducers with high viability. Essentially the form of ENS observed in Model 3 is not very 
different from weak ENS apart from the fact that there is minimal reproduction in the model. I 
name it minimally-reproductive ENS and it does not satisfy c. 
M
o
d
e
l 
Property bore 
by the entities 
apart from 
viability  
Description of the new 
property introduced by the 
Model 
Entities in 
the 
population  
Type of ENS observed 
1 None NA Survivors Weak: With complete exhaustion 
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Table 1: The different concepts explored in Sections 2 and 3  
 
4. Heredity on and paradigmatic ENS 
of the population 
2 Procreation  Reproduction without any 
heredity, including heredity of 
the ability to procreate 
Survivors 
Procreator 
Quasi-Weak: With complete 
exhaustion of the population but 
over a longer period of time than 
with survivors  
3 Unreliable  
minimal 
reproduction 
Heredity of the ability to 
procreate. The level of the 
ability to procreate is inherited 
at an unpredictable level. 
Survivors 
Unreliable 
minimal 
reproducers 
Unreliable-minimally-
reproductive: size of the 
population self-maintained, but 
changes in the background against 
which new mutations can occur 
are impossible.  
4 Reliable 
minimal 
reproduction 
/ 
Reproduction 
Heredity of and on the ability 
to procreate. The level of the 
ability to procreate is inherited 
at a predictable level. 
Successive mutation increasing 
the level of transmission 
(heredity of) and fidelity 
(heredity on) of the ability to 
procreate can be selected. 
Heredity of and on the ability 
to procreate reach a maximum.  
Survivors  
Reliable 
minimal 
reproducers 
then 
Reproducer
s only 
 From reliable-minimally-reproductive 
to reproductive: as in Model 3 but 
with possible changes in the 
background against which new 
mutations can occur. 
Reproduction is a cumulative 
adaptation resulting from 
successive mutation on the level 
of transmission and fidelity of the 
ability to procreate.  
5 Darwinian 
minimal 
reproduction 
Heredity of the ability to 
procreate. Heredity on one or 
more traits having 
consequences on the viability 
or fertility on the entities 
bearers of these traits 
Survivors 
Darwinian 
Reproducer
s  
minimally-reproductive and cumulative: 
complex cumulative adaptations 
are possible  
6 Reproduction
/ 
Replication 
Initially as in Model 5, 
reproduction without heredity 
on any other trait, but 
apparition and selection of 
successive mutation increasing 
the heredity on traits with 
consequences on the viability 
or fertility of their bearers so 
that Darwinian reproduction 
appears. Heredity on these 
traits reach the maximal level 
of 1 so that Darwinian 
reproduction becomes 
replication  
Reproducer
s 
then 
Darwinian 
reproducers  
then  
Replicators 
reproductive and cumulative i.e. 
paradigmatic: complex cumulative 
adaptations are possible  
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Heredity of properties such as the ability to procreate or viability is thus insufficient for natural 
selection to record past successes and failures in reproducing populations and therefore to 
change the population-level background. In the following model (Model 4), taking the same set-
up as in Model 3, I introduce heredity on viability in order to evaluate whether it allows the 
entities with the highest viability to invade population and thus change the population-level 
background against which new mutations can occur (see Table 1). There is no straightforward 
way to choose which level of heredity on viability should be introduced. With perfect heredity on 
viability, the same survival rate is transmitted from the parent to the offspring. With a very low 
heredity, this viability is only slightly more likely to be transmitted than any other. For the sake of 
simplicity, I chose to introduce perfect heredity on viability in Model 4. The mutant initially 
present in the population is still an unreliable minimal reproducer because the ability to 
reproduce is not transmitted reliably from parent to offspring, but it is also what I call a 
Darwinian reproducer because its viability, one of the components of fitness (hence the 
qualification of Darwinian), is transmitted with a higher probability than chance to its offspring. 
 
Figure 4. Simulation of Model 4 over 150 units of time 
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Figure 4 represents the graph of a typical simulation of Model 4 over 150 units of time in which 
the proportion of entities with a viability of 0.99 is measured. The figure shows that the 
proportion of entities with a survival rate equal to 0.99, very low at t=0, increases and in contrast 
to Model 3 does not reach an equilibrium but rapidly invades the population. This is explained 
by the fact that, because there is heredity on viability in this set-up, successes and failures are 
now recorded by natural selection. Each survivor procreated by a minimal reproducer has the 
same viability as its parent. Because more procreated individuals (whether survivors or minimal 
reproducers) have a viability of 0.99 and the population is able to maintain its size, the variants 
with the highest fitness invade the population.  
Thus, Model 4 shows that heredity on viability allows the population to satisfy c. In the 
population described by the model, individual changes brought about by advantageous mutations 
can be transmitted to the whole population. This is the mark of cumulative ENS and of 
populations able to display complex adaptations such as the human eye or brain. I call this form 
of ENS, minimally-reproductive cumulative ENS.. Yet, minimally-reproductive cumulative ENS is not 
reproductive cumulative ENS (i.e. paradigmatic ENS), in which there are no minimal reproducers 
anymore but reproducers only, all able to transmit indefinitely their ability to procreate to all 
their offspring. For a population to be able to exhibit paradigmatic ENS it must meet 
requirement d 
 With Model 5 I will show that high fidelity heredity on the ability to procreate is a cumulative or 
complex adaptation of mixed populations of survivors and minimal reproducers (i.e. initially 
exhibiting minimally-reproductive ENS) leading those populations to exhibit reproductive ENS (i.e. 
ENS in which every entity reproduces) and thus satisfy d. Although Model 4 showed that 
heredity on viability is an adaptation, it did not show how we can move from a population with 
no heredity on viability to a population with a high level of heredity on viability. That is what I 
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will demonstrate with Model 6, in which both c and d are satisfied within one and the same 
population.   
How can we get reproductive ENS from a mixed population of survivors and minimal 
reproducers? To answer this question, I start with the set-up used in Model 3 in which we have 
heredity of the ability to procreate (at a low level: 0.2) but no heredity on this ability. The result 
we observed was a population ultimately able to maintain its initial size but composed of a mix 
of survivors and minimal reproducers with very low levels of heredity of the ability to procreate. 
To have a population composed of reproducers only, two things must happen. First, the ability 
to procreate must be transmitted to every offspring of minimal reproducers – i.e. there needs to 
be heredity of the ability to procreate at the maximal level (1) resulting in the population 
becoming a population of reproducers. Second, each offspring procreated by a reproducer must 
receive the ability to procreate at the same level as its parent. In other words, there must be 
perfect heredity on the ability to procreate, the population thus becoming a population of reliable 
reproducers. Our question thus becomes: How can we move from a population similar to the 
population of Model 3 to a population with perfect heredity on the ability to procreate at a 
maximal rate, i.e. a population of reliable reproducers?  
Model 5 shows how that is possible. There are two crucial differences between Model 3 and 
Model 5 (see Table 1). In Model 5, on top of the three stages (selection, reproduction and 
checking-for-overcrowding) undergone by each minimal reproducer, a fourth “mutation” stage is 
added before the selection stage so that the sequence of events undergone by every individual 
each unit of time is mutation  selection  reproduction  check-for-overcrowding. During the mutation 
stage, each minimal reproducer can mutate independently on two traits at a 10-3 rate. A mutation 
on the first trait increases or decreases the maximal rate at which an individual is able to transmit 
its ability to procreate (i.e. increases or decreases heredity of this ability). If the maximal rate of 
transmission of a minimal reproducer is 1, it becomes a reproducer. A mutation on the second 
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trait increases or decreases the fidelity at which the maximal ability to procreate of an individual 
is transmitted. If the fidelity of the transmission of the ability to procreate is nil, there is no 
heredity on the ability to procreate at a given level. If the fidelity is perfect, there is perfect 
heredity on the ability to procreate and unreliable reproducers become reliable reproducers.  
As with Model 3, I initially set the maximal level of heredity of the ability to procreate at 0.2 for 
each minimal reproducer in the population. This means that at most, only 20% of the offspring 
of these minimal reproducers will also be minimal reproducers. The other 80% will be survivors. 
The fidelity at which each minimal reproducer can transmit its ability is initially nil, so that there 
is no heredity on the ability to procreate. This means that each procreated minimal reproducer 
will have initially a level of heredity of the ability to procreate randomly chosen between 0 and 
0.2. At each event of mutation on the maximal level of the ability to procreate, a minimal 
reproducer chosen randomly in the population sees its maximal level of procreation increase or 
decrease by 0.01 with the same probability. Mutatis mutandis, at each event of mutation on the 
fidelity of transmission of the ability to procreate, a minimal reproducer chosen randomly sees 
the fidelity at which it will transmit its ability to procreate increase or decrease by 0.01. All other 
parameters are kept identical to Model 3. 
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Figure 5a. Simulation of Model 5 over 11000 units of time 
Figure 5a represents a typical simulation of Model 5 in which the number of survivors and 
reproducers, as well as the total number of individuals is recorded over time. During the first  
units of time (which are not visible because figure 5a is not detailed enough) the total number of 
individuals rapidly decreases. The explanation is strictly the same as for the previous models: 
most survivors and minimal reproducers die because their survival rate is low. Only survivors 
and minimal reproducers with a high viability survive. Some of the minimal reproducers start 
procreating new minimal reproducers with a maximal rate of 0.2, which in turn are able to 
reproduce. This explains why the population does not go extinct and starts increasing in size: 
more and more minimal reproducers are procreated. Figure 5b, shows that both the maximal 
level of heredity of the ability to procreate and the mean fidelity of heredity on the ability to 
procreate, starting respectively with a value of 0 and 0.2, reach values superior to 0.99 after 
t=884000 and t=104000 respectively (in this simulation). This explains why at t=104000, the 
population is composed of more than 99.5 % minimal reproducers (which are now effectively 
reproducers). At that stage almost no survivors are procreated because the maximal level of 
heredity on the ability to procreate is nearly 1 and the fidelity with which this level is transmitted 
is also nearly 1 (as shown on figure 5b). If this level is not reached in both cases it is only due to 
the fact that some minimal reproducers mutate every unit of time (on average 5 individuals per 
unit of time in a population of 5000) and half of those mutations reduce the average fidelity and 
average maximal level of transmission of the ability to procreate.   
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Figure 5b. Simulation of Model 5 over 110000 units of time 
Model 5 shows that high heredity of the ability to procreate, as well as high fidelity on the level 
of transmission of the ability to procreate are both attractors of minimal Darwinian populations. 
In fact, a population composed mostly of survivors and minimal reproducers with a very low 
level of heredity of the ability to procreate and very low fidelity of transmission of this ability is 
invaded by mutants with very high level of heredity and fidelity on this trait and the population 
becomes a population of reproducers. More interestingly, mutants that overall decrease the number 
of minimal reproducers produced each unit of time, which represent 50 % of all mutations, seem 
to play no or only a limited role in the evolutionary dynamics of the population. There is here an 
asymmetry between mutations increasing or mutations decreasing the level of heredity of and on 
the ability to procreate. This asymmetry is what makes changes of the population-level 
background against which new mutations can occur possible.  
The explanation underlying the asymmetry is the following. Each time a new mutation increases 
either the maximal level of heredity of the ability to procreate or the fidelity with which this 
maximal level is transmitted (i.e. heredity on this ability), this increases the rate of production of 
minimal reproducers because the minimal reproducers procreated are themselves able to 
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procreate new minimal reproducers. If, on the contrary, a mutation increases the level of 
production of survivors (via a mutation decreasing heredity of or on the ability to procreate), this 
mutation will have long-term downstream consequences that will lead the bearers of this 
mutation to have overall less offspring than the rest of the population and their type will be less 
represented (and ultimately eliminated) from the population. This, I claim, represents a genuine 
case of cumulative ENS. Reproduction can thus be a complex (or multiple-step) adaptation in 
minimal Darwinian populations which emerges as a result of cumulative ENS. Model 5 satisfies 
requirement d, but as such not requirement c because heredity on traits other than the ability to 
procreate is nil.  
In a population in which every individual minimally reproduces, paradigmatic ENS is now 
extremely easy to get. The only requirement is heredity on traits having consequences for 
viability or fertility as in Model 4. When this occurs, reproductive cumulative ENS – i.e. 
paradigmatic ENS – becomes possible and structures like the human eye become in principle 
much more likely to appear because the number of trials made by natural selection is maximal. 
To show this, I created Model 6 (see Table 1), which starts with the setup obtained at the end of 
the simulation of Model 5: a population of reproducers.  
In a population of reproducers, as I defined them, the only trait reliably transmitted is the ability 
to procreate. All other traits are uncorrelated between parents and offspring. Let us now imagine 
a population of reproducers in which each reproducer is able to mutate, as in Model 5, but on 
two different traits, one increasing or decreasing its viability,8 the other increasing or decreasing 
the fidelity with which its viability will be transmitted to its offspring. If paradigmatic ENS is 
possible in such population, we should expect that ultimately the population will be invaded by 
individuals with the highest possible viability allowed by the model.  
                                                          
8 A similar mutation could appear and affect fertility. 
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In Model 6, I start with a population of reproducers with viabilities and fertilities all chosen 
randomly between 0 and 0.99 and 0 and 10 respectively. As in Model 5 there is initially no 
heredity on viability and fertility. However, unlike Model 5, individuals can mutate at a 10-3 rate 
and increase or decrease their viability by 0.01 (unless the viability is already maximal), but also 
increase or decrease the fidelity with which viability is transmitted to their offspring, if any, and 
transmit this level of fidelity to their offspring with the same rate. As in Model 5 the initial 
population is composed of 5000 individuals. For the sake of simplicity, viability is transmitted as 
if it were only dependent on one trait (e.g. size), but more complex simulations could be used 
with viability depending on more traits.  
 
  
Figure 6. Simulation of Model 6 over 145000 units of time 
Model 6 shows two things. First, high heredity on viability can be a complex adaptation of 
populations of reproducers analogous to reproduction as an adaptation of populations of 
minimal reproducers. As can be seen in figure 6, although half of the mutations decrease the 
fidelity of transmission of viability (i.e. heredity on viability) from parent to offspring, after 
t=133000, fidelity is maximal. This is explained by the fact that reproducers with higher viability 
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have more offspring than reproducers with lower viability when they are able to transmit their 
viability with a probability higher than chance. This also explains why the mean viability of the 
population initially slowly increases (from 0.5 to 0.575 at t=130000 in this simulation). As 
heredity on viability reaches its maximal value, the dynamic of the population radically changes: 
The mean viability of the population rapidly increases until it reaches the maximal value allowed 
by the model and remains at that level. The explanation here is exactly the same as previously. 
The only difference is that reproducers are now replicators. Replicators are able to transmit 
Darwinian traits to all their offspring with very high fidelity. When that happens, any difference 
increasing fitness leads to large differences in the population-level background against which new 
mutations can occur. Indeed, at that point any mutation increasing the viability of replicators is 
perfectly recorded by natural selection. Increases in viability are also recorded before the 
appearance of replicators, but the recording is imperfect and thus changes in population level 
background do not have the dramatic effects they have in populations of replicators.  
A further distinction can be made between minimal replicators, replicators and ultimate replicators. 
Minimal replicators only transmit faithfully one of their traits (aside from the ability to procreate) 
to their offspring.9 Replicators transmit faithfully more than one trait to their offspring, while 
ultimate replicators are replicators in a classical sense (Dawkins 1982, Hull 1980) and transmit all 
their traits to their offspring. Further models could show that the selection of a global 
mechanism of transmission of many, if not all traits, is more advantageous than a successive 
selection of mechanisms of transmission for each Darwinian trait. Thus structures like DNA 
with ‘unlimited’ heredity (Maynard Smith & Szathmáry 1995, 43) and proofreading during 
transmission, are expected products of natural selection. I leave this demonstration open to 
further work. 
                                                          
9 This definition of replicators leads to a form of replication similar to the one argued for by 
Nanay (2011) who claims that replication is about properties rather than entities. 
To appear in Biology and Philosophy 
This version my slightly differ from the final publication 
29 
 
Using different models I have shown that reproduction and heredity, usually conceived of as 
requirements for ENS, are actually predictable products of it, given that new variation is 
introduced in a population of survivors. By doing so, I have endogeneized reproduction and 
heredity in a broader conception of ENS.  
5. Assessing the endogenization-of-heredity hypothesis   
 
The six models I have proposed demonstrate that under very flexible assumptions both 
reproduction and heredity are likely to appear and spread by natural selection in populations of 
entities in which those properties are not initially present. It follows that they embody a 
conception of ENS more abstract than standard conceptions in which reproduction and heredity 
are taken as necessary conditions for selection to occur. Griesemer (2005) argues that 
abstractions of Darwinian evolutionary theory take two forms. One consists in abstracting the 
level at which evolution by natural selection can occur. This is the strategy adopted by Lewontin 
(1970) in his classical paper “The Units of Selection”. The other strategy consists in abstracting 
away from the contingent mechanisms of biological entities, keeping only the functions that are 
necessary and sufficient for ENS. Where do the endogenization-of-heredity hypothesis resulting 
from the 6 models I have proposed stand with regards to Griesmer’s two forms of abstraction? 
In none of the 6 models did I make any assumptions concerning the level at which the 
mechanisms of viability, heredity of and heredity occur. Nor did I give a precise mechanism of 
heredity. Thus, these models represent both an abstraction from any specific level of selection 
and an abstraction away from specific biological mechanisms. They employ both of Griesemer’s 
strategies of abstraction. 
Earlier examples of the second strategy of abstraction have concluded that replication is 
necessary for ENS (Dawkins 1982, Hull 1980). My models demonstrate this conclusion is not 
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justified, since Darwinian origin and distribution explanations are both perfectly possible in 
populations of survivors rather than replicators. In fact, my endogenization-of-heredity 
hypothesis represents a plausible Darwinian origin explanation of heredity starting with survivors 
and assuming some random events of mutation. The endogenization-of-heredity hypothesis 
shows that the notion of replicator is perfectly dispensable from the notion of ENS.  
Some will regard the abstraction instantiated by the six models as justified simply by the fact that 
it allows the statement of the endogenization-of-heredity hypothesis. Others will wonder what 
role such a very abstract generalization of Darwinian theory can have in understanding real 
biological phenomena. In the remainder of this section I explore three areas in which the 
endogenization-of-heredity model I have proposed could potentially be useful.  
The first area in which the endogenization-of-heredity model can be applied is obviously origins 
of life studies and especially in the study of the origin of evolution by natural selection. Here is 
not the place to discuss the different theories on the origins of life and the strengths and 
weaknesses of each of them (for reviews see Cleland forthcoming; Dyson 1999; Fry 2011; 
Maynard Smith & Szathmáry 1995). I simply note that the origins of life and the origins of 
evolution by natural selection, although often treated simultaneously should be treated 
separately, for a population might be composed of entities considered as alive and yet not 
undergoing ENS. To a large extent the series of models I have proposed represents a detailed 
scenario of Dawkins’s hypothesis in the second chapter of The Selfish Gene (Dawkins, 1976) 
where he notes in passing that “Darwin's 'survival of the fittest' is really a special case of a more 
general law of survival of the stable” (1976, 13, my emphasis) and that life originated from selection 
of molecules for stability. But Dawkins jumps very quickly to the idea that through some 
improbable but possible event a molecule or a complex of molecules must have acquired the 
ability to self-replicate using small building-blocks available in its surroundings and thus become 
the first “replicator”. The same leap is made by Michod (1999) and by Maynard Smith and 
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Szathmáry (1995) among others. These authors presuppose that evolution becomes an 
interesting phenomenon (and that life emerges) only when an entity is able to self-replicate with 
high fidelity. One virtue of the endogenization-of-heredity model I have proposed, is that it 
shows that ENS can occur and lead to a complex adaptation such as high-fidelity heredity even 
without high-fidelity replication initially. The replicator-first view of the origins of ENS is thus 
unwarranted. Whether the scenario I have proposed for the origins of reproduction and heredity 
is the correct one is not of first importance since my goal was primarily to clarify the space of 
possibilities with respect to reproduction and heredity. And in fact, procreation, ‘heredity of’ and 
‘heredity on’ might have originated simultaneously, rather than sequentially. But the value of 
recognizing that there are two different concepts behind what is termed usually referred as 
“heredity” is demonstrated by the fact that it allows us to see that there are alternative scenarios 
for this key step in evolution. 
Another domain for which the endogenization-of-heredity hypothesis might be applicable is in 
the broader study of major transition. In the models proposed above, the agents could represent 
any entities at any level. Procreators and minimal reproducers could represent early multicellular 
organisms for example. Each primordial multicellular organism would initially fission and would 
pass on its traits at the collective level more or less randomly from one generation to the other. 
Collectives would even at that stage be selected for and evolve by natural selection, because the 
collectives that passed on their traits with more certainty to their offspring would have an 
advantage and spread. 
Finally, the endogeneization-of-heredity hypothesis might be useful in other domains in which 
the Darwinian apparatus has been deployed, most notably with cultural evolution (Godfrey-
Smith 2009; Mesoudi, Whiten, & Laland 2004; Richerson & Boyd 2005). If a replicator is not 
necessary for ENS in the biological realm, then efforts to find a cultural analog may be 
unnecessary. This conclusion should be welcomed by cultural evolutionists, since forms of 
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‘memetics’ relying strongly on the notion of replicator (Blackmore 2000; Dawkins 1976; Dennett 
1995) have failed to produce many significant results and their theoretical foundations have been 
heavily criticized (e.g. Sperber 1996, 2000).  
The mere fact that the endogenzization-of-heredity hypothesis raises questions about what 
counts as Darwinian evolution is important and might lead to further development of the idea.  
   
6. Conclusion  
In this paper I have shown four things about ENS. First, strictly speaking reproduction is not 
needed for ENS to occur. Viability selection is sufficient to produce evolutionary changes 
through the action of natural selection. If reproduction is not necessary, the same can be said 
about heredity, since the former is a prerequisite for the latter. Second, I have shown that 
paradigmatic ENS can arise through successive episodes of adaptation in populations of 
survivors, provided that suitable mutations can arise in these populations. In doing so, I have 
endogeneized reproduction and heredity into a broader conception of ENS. Third, I have briefly 
shown that replicators, and specific replicating structures such as DNA, can arise as adaptations 
in populations of entities that do not reproduce with high-fidelity. Finally, I have shown potential 
application of the endogenization-of-heredity hypothesis in three domains of current biological 
research. One implication of these ideas I have not developed and leave for further work is the 
links between heredity and the concept of fitness. We have seen that even without differences in 
viability or/and fertility the evolutionary success of entities with different level of heredity on the 
ability to procreate could be predicted. This seems problematic if a classical definition of fitness 
based on viability and fertility is used.  
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